Shelby County, Alabama, v. Holder, Attorney General, et al.

Shelby County v. Holder

Case 529

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

No. 12–96

Argued February 27, 2013

Decided June 25, 2013

Syllabus

Background

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.South Carolina v. KatzenbachUS vol. 383 case 301 p. 309. Section 2 of the Act, which bans any standard, practice, or procedure that results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or colorUSC title 42 § 1973(a), applies nationwide, is permanent, and is not at issue in this case. Other sections apply only to some parts of the country. Section 4 of the Act provides the coverage formula, defining the covered jurisdictions as States or political subdivisions that maintained tests or devices as prerequisites to voting, and had low voter registration or turnout, in the 1960s and early 1970s.§ 1973(b). In those covered jurisdictions, § 5 of the Act provides that no change in voting procedures can take effect until approved by specified federal authorities in Washington, DC.§ 1973c(a). Such approval is known as preclearance.

The coverage formula and preclearance requirement were initially set to expire after five years, but the Act has been reauthorized several times. In 2006, the Act was reauthorized for an additional 25 years, but the coverage formula was not changed. Coverage still turned on whether a jurisdiction had a voting test in the 1960s or 1970s, and had low voter registration or turnout at that time. Shortly after the 2006 reauthorization, a Texas utility district sought to bail out from the Acts coverage and, in the alternative, challenged the Act's constitutionality. This Court resolved the challenge on statutory grounds, but expressed serious doubts about the Act's continued constitutionality.See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. HolderUS vol. 557 case 193.

Petitioner Shelby County, in the covered jurisdiction of Alabama, sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court in Washington, DC, seeking a declaratory judgment that § 4(b) and § 5 are facially unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The District Court upheld the Act, finding that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was sufficient to justify reauthorizing § 5 and continuing § 4(b)'s coverage formula. The DC Circuit affirmed. After surveying the evidence in the record, that court accepted Congress's conclusion that § 2 litigation remained inadequate in the covered jurisdictions to protect the right of minority voters, that § 5 was therefore still necessary, and that the coveage formula continued to pass constitutional muster.§ I.

Held

Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula no longer can be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.§§ II to III–C.

In Northwest Austin, this Court noted that the Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs and concluded that a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.US vol. 557 p. 203. These basic principles guide review of the question presented here.§ II.

State legislation may not contravene federal law. States retain broad autonomy, however, in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment reserves to the States all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government, including the power to regulate elections.Gregory v. AshcroftUS vol. 501 case 452 pp. 461–462. There is also among the States a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty, which is highly pertinent in assessing disparate treatment of States.Northwest Austinsupra p. 203.

The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It requires States to beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own. And, despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act applies to only nine Statesand additional counties. That is why, in 1966, this Court described the Act as stringent and potentUS vol. 383 case Katzenbach pp. 308, 315, 337.. The Court nonetheless upheld the Act, concluding that such an uncommon exercise of congressional power could be justified by exceptional conditions.Id. p. 334.§ II–A.

In 1966, these departures were justified by the blight of racial discrimination in voting that had infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a centuryUS vol. 383 case Katzenbach p. 308. At the time, the coverage formula—the means of linking the exercise of the unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted it—made sense. The Act was limited to areas where Congress found evidence of actual voting discrimination, and the govered jurisdictions shared two characteristics: the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the national average.Id. p. 330. The Court explained that tests and devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of their long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate must inevitably affect the number of actual voters.Ibid. The Court therefore concluded that the coverage formula was rational in both practice and theory.Ibid.§ II–B.

Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically. Largely because of the Voting Rights Act: Voter turnout and registration rates in covered jurisdictions now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.Northwest Austinsupra p. 202. The tests and devices that blocked ballot access have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years. Yet the Act has not eased § 5's restrictions or narrowed the scope of § 4's coverage formula along the way. Instead those extraordinary and unprecedented features have been reauthorized as if nothing has changed, and they have grown even stronger. Because § 5 applies only to those jurisdictions singled out by § 4, the Court turns to consider that provision.§ II–C.

Section 4's formula is unconstitutional in light of current conditions.§§ III–A to III–C.

1: In 1966, the coverage formula was rational in both practice and theory.Katzenbachsupra p. 330. It looked to causediscriminatory tests and effectlow voter registration and turnout, and tailored the remedypreclearance to those jurisdictions exhibiting both. By 2009, however, the coverage formula raised serious constitutional questions.Northwest Austinsupra p. 204. Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned for over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in covered States have risen dramatically. In 1965, the States could be divided into those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout and those without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation no longer is divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.§ III–A.
2: The Government attempts to defend the formula on grounds that is reverse-engineered: Congress identified the jurisdictions to be covered and then came up with criteria to describe them. Katzenbach did not sanction such an approach, reasoning instead that the coverage formula was rational because the formula was relevant to the problem.US vol. 383 pp. 329, 330. The Government has a fallback argument: because the formula was relevant in 1965, its continued use is permissible so long as any discrimination remains in the States identified in 1965. But this does not look to current political conditionsNorthwest Austinsupra p. 203, instead relying on a comparison between the States in 1965. But history did not end in 1965. In assessing the current need for a preclearance system treating States differently from one another today, history since 1965 cannot be ignored. The Fifteenth Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future. To serve that purpose, Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions.§ III–B.
3: Respondents also rely heavily on data from the record compiled by Congress before reauthorizing the Act. Regardless of how one looks at that record, no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the pervasive, flagrant, widespread, and rampant discrimination that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation in 1965.Katzenbachsupra pp. 308, 315, 331; Northwest Austinsupra p. 201. But a more fundamental problem remains: Congress did not use that record to fashion a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reënacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.§ III–C.

F. 3d vol. 679 case 848, reversed.

Roberts, CJ, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ, joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ, joined.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem. Section 5 of the Act required States to obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to voting—a drastic departure from basic principles of federalism. And § 4 of the Act applied that requirement only to some States—an equally dramatic departure from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty. This was strong medicine, but Congress determined it was needed to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.South Carolina v. KatzenbachUS vol. 383 case 3011966 p. 309. As we explained in upholding the law, exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.Id. p. 334. Reflecting the unprecedented nature of these measures, they were scheduled to expire after five years.See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a)Stat. vol. 79 p. 438.

I

A

B

II

A

B

C

III

A

B

C

D

Striking down an Act of Congress is the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.Blodgett v. HoldenUS vol. 275 case 1421927 p. 148Holmes, J., concurring. We do not do so lightly. That is why, in 2009, we took care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act when asked to do so, and instead resolved the case then before us on statutory grounds. But, in issuing that decision, we expressed our broader concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional. The formula in that section no longer can be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.

Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2. We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions. Such a formula is an initial prerequisite to a determination that exceptional conditions still exist justifying such an extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government.US vol. 502 case Pressley pp. 500–501. Our country has changed, and, while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Thomas, J., concurring

Justice Thomas, concurring.

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.