In year 1993, a company (1) buys a lot in order to build a Dunkin Donuts restaurant on it, and (2) leases a 30&h;year easement over a 20&h;foot strip of a second, adjacent lot in order to build a drivethrough.

In year 2023, the easement expires. The company sues the owner of the adjacent lot to extend the easement. Its arguments: (1) The actual intended duration of the easement is, not 30 years, but however long a Dunkin Donuts restaurant exists on the first lot. (2) If the easement is not extended, then the company will experience a hardship from having to tear out a chunk of its restaurant to make room for a drivethrough on its own property. The owner of the adjacent lot countersues for trespass, since the drivethrough still is operating even though the lease has expired.

The trial judge finds the company's arguments unpersuasive, rejects its attempts to extend the easement, and grants trespass damages of 1 k$/mo to the owner of the adjacent lot. (1) The easement says “30 years”. If you wanted to make it “for as long as a Dunkin Donuts restaurant is present”, you could have done that—but you didn&a;t. (2) This is a hardship of your own creation. The appeals panel affirms.

A drunk woman jaywalks across a four&h;lane, 50&h;mi/h road at night. An eastbound motorist swerves around her. A westbound motorist does not notice the eastbound swerve, and hits the jaywalker, killing her.

The jaywalker&a;s daughter sues the motorist for wrongful death. She hires an expert (a “traffic&h;accident reconstructionist”) who claims that, if the motorist had noticed the eastbound swerve, then he would have had time to notice and avoid the jaywalker.

The trial judge dismisses the lawsuit, and the appeals panel affirms. The expert&a;s report is not sufficient to support liability. He did not say that the motorist should have seen the eastbound swerve and slowed down out of caution (so he was negligent in failing to see it), or that his headlights should have allowed him to see and avoid the jaywalker (so he was negligent in failing to see her). Rather, the expert based his conclusion on a hypothetical situation (“if the motorist had noticed the eastbound swerve”) that the motorist explicitly denied in his unchallenged testimony (he didn&a;t notice any swerving cars). Therefore, there is no reason to think that the motorist was negligent. “Plaintiff failed to present any competent evidence that defendant could have, would have, or should have seen the swerve.”

In year 1995, by constitutional amendment, New Jersey creates the “Council on Local Mandates”, a pseudo&h;court empowered to strike down any unfunded mandate imposed by the state govt. on local govts.

In year 2014, the state govt. enacts a law (1) requiring municipal govts. to equip their police cars with dash cameras and (2) adding to each drunk&h;driving conviction a 25&h;dollar surcharge allocated to pay for the cameras. A municipal govt. challenges this law before the Council on Local Mandates, alleging that it is an unfunded mandate, since the 25&h;dollar surcharge suffices to pay for only six percent of the cost of the cameras. In year 2016, the Council agrees with the municipal govt. and rules that the law is unconstitutional.

In year 2021, a class&h;action lawsuit alleges that municipal govts. still are collecting the 25&h;dollar surcharge even though the Council ruled it unconstitutional. In response, the municipal govts. argue that the Council was empowered to strike down only the unfunded mandate itself (part 1 of the law), not the inadequate funding mechanism attached to the mandate, which has purposes other than attempting to fund the unconstitutional mandate (punishing offenders and raising revenue). The trial judge agrees with this argument and rules that municipal govts. are justified in continuing to collect the 25-dollar surcharge. The appeals panel (in year 2024) and the state supreme court (in year 2026) affirm.

Together for a weekend under a custody agreement are two children, their mother, and their stepfather. The adults accuse the children of agitating the adults&a; dog. The children deny the accusation, and the adults further accuse them of lying. To punish one of the children (age not specified; the other child is nine years old), the adults decide to conduct a makeshift waterboarding! As the stepfather supervises, the mother leans the child backward over a bathroom sink, covers her face with a rag, pinches her nose shut, and pours water over the rag.

The child is not tightly restrained, and soon leans forward again, causing the adults to end the procedure. Still, after custody switches back to the children&a;s father and stepmother and the incident is reported to the police, this is enough for both the mother and the stepfather to be convicted of several crimes (assault, strangulation, endangerment of child&a;s welfare, reckless endangerment, and conspiracy) and sentenced to 23 months of jail (with the possibility of parole after six months). The appeals panel affirms in both the mother&a;s case and the stepfather&a;s.

A prison guard is accused of smuggling a can of chewing tobacco into the prison. However, the prosecutor charges him under the wrong law! Title 61 section 5902(d) bans the smuggling of tobacco—but instead the officer is charged with violating title 18 section 5123(c) and title 61 section 5902(a), which ban the smuggling of poison.

The prosecutor attempts to save the situation by bringing in a toxicology expert to argue that a can of chewing tobacco counts as poison, since it technically contains enough nicotine to kill a human if the nicotine is extracted from the tobacco and injected into the human. But the trial judge is unpersuaded and dismisses the case, since (1) there is no evidence that the inmate for whom the guard was smuggling the tobacco had any plans to extract the nicotine and use it as a poison, and (2) this line of reasoning would lead to absurd results like criminalizing the delivery of toothpaste and water. The appeals panel affirms.

A man pleads guilty to aggravated indecent assault of a 14&h;year&h;old girl while 19 years old, just outside the state&a;s four&h;year Romeo&h;and&h;Juliet margin.^∗ He is sentenced to five years of probation.

Having violated his probation, he is resentenced to two years of jail (with the possibility of parole after one year) plus three years of probation.

Having violated his probation for a second time, he is resentenced to six months of jail (with the possibility of parole after three months) plus five years of probation.

Having violated his probation for a third time, he is resentenced to two months of jail plus five years of probation.

He has violated his probation for a fourth time. The judge refrains from resentencing him, and instead gives him one last chance to shape up, warning that upon a fifth probation violation the judge will put him in state prison rather than just county jail.

Having violated his probation for a fifth time, he is resentenced to 7.5 years of prison (with the possibility of parole after three years) plus three years of probation. He protests that the judge failed to properly consider his rehabilitative needs, but the appeals panel affirms (in 2026-06).